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Summa Theologiae · I, q. 3, a. 2

Whether God Is Composed of Matter and Form?

Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, First Part, question 3, On the Simplicity of God, article 2. About 3 min.

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Text: Summa Theologiae, Project Gutenberg #17611, First Part (Prima Pars), translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. The First Part of the Summa in the English Dominican translation (first printed 1911 to 1925; second and revised edition from 1920). A sample check on 2026-11-09 against pre-1931 printings at the Internet Archive (first printings of 1915 and 1916 and the second and revised edition of the 1920s) found that the article text matches, with no 1947 introduction, synopsis, or index. The phrase “From the Complete American Edition” in Gutenberg's catalog title is a provenance note only. Question and article numbers were added by the transcriber. Rights: Public domain (US)

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Objection 1: It seems that God is composed of matter and form. For whatever has a soul is composed of matter and form; since the soul is the form of the body. But Scripture attributes a soul to God; for it is mentioned in Hebrews (Heb. 10:38), where God says: "But My just man liveth by faith; but if he withdraw himself, he shall not please My soul." Therefore God is composed of matter and form.

Obj. 2: Further, anger, joy and the like are passions of the composite. But these are attributed to God in Scripture: "The Lord was exceeding angry with His people" (Ps. 105:40). Therefore God is composed of matter and form.

Obj. 3: Further, matter is the principle of individualization. But God seems to be individual, for He cannot be predicated of many. Therefore He is composed of matter and form.

On the contrary, Whatever is composed of matter and form is a body; for dimensive quantity is the first property of matter. But God is not a body as proved in the preceding Article; therefore He is not composed of matter and form.

I answer that, It is impossible that matter should exist in God. First, because matter is in potentiality. But we have shown (Q. 2, A. 3) that God is pure act, without any potentiality. Hence it is impossible that God should be composed of matter and form. Secondly, because everything composed of matter and form owes its perfection and goodness to its form; therefore its goodness is participated, inasmuch as matter participates the form. Now the first good and the best--viz. God--is not a participated good, because the essential good is prior to the participated good. Hence it is impossible that God should be composed of matter and form. Thirdly, because every agent acts by its form; hence the manner in which it has its form is the manner in which it is an agent. Therefore whatever is primarily and essentially an agent must be primarily and essentially form. Now God is the first agent, since He is the first efficient cause. He is therefore of His essence a form; and not composed of matter and form.

Reply Obj. 1: A soul is attributed to God because His acts resemble the acts of a soul; for, that we will anything, is due to our soul. Hence what is pleasing to His will is said to be pleasing to His soul.

Reply Obj. 2: Anger and the like are attributed to God on account of a similitude of effect. Thus, because to punish is properly the act of an angry man, God's punishment is metaphorically spoken of as His anger.

Reply Obj. 3: Forms which can be received in matter are individualized by matter, which cannot be in another as in a subject since it is the first underlying subject; although form of itself, unless something else prevents it, can be received by many. But that form which cannot be received in matter, but is self-subsisting, is individualized precisely because it cannot be received in a subject; and such a form is God. Hence it does not follow that matter exists in God.

Also online, linked only: the same translation at New Advent and the Latin text at Corpus Thomisticum. Neither is copied here.

Source: Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, First Part. Project Gutenberg #17611. Project Gutenberg record. Public domain in the USA. Outside the U.S., check local copyright rules. Project Gutenberg notices retained. The full Project Gutenberg license is kept in the hosted text.