Bibliotheca Catholicaa library of libraries
Support
Summa Theologiae · Suppl., q. 98, a. 1

Whether every act of will in the damned is evil?

Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Supplement, question 98, Of the Will and Intellect of the Damned, article 1. About 3 min.

Read in the reading room → This article at New Advent

From the Supplement, compiled after Aquinas’s death from his Commentary on the Sentences and transcribed here from the 1917 to 1922 printings. About the Supplement.

Text: Summa Theologiae, Supplement to the Third Part (Supplementum Tertiae Partis), transcribed from Internet Archive scans, translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. The Supplement, compiled after Aquinas’s death from his earlier Commentary on the Sentences, in the same English Dominican translation as the Gutenberg Parts. Transcribed by Bibliotheca Catholica from the OCR of four Internet Archive scans of the pre-1931 printings (Questions 1 to 33 from the 1917 Washbourne and Benziger volume, 34 to 68 from the 1922 volume, 69 to 86 from the 1921 volume, and 87 to 99 from the 1922 Benziger volume), with OCR errors corrected and doubtful passages marked, not rewritten. 99 questions and 446 articles. The two appendices printed after Question 99 are not included. Sources, SHA-256 of each OCR file, and the method are in the source record. Rights: Public domain (US)

The Supplement is not a Project Gutenberg text. It is Bibliotheca Catholica’s transcription of public-domain scans at the Internet Archive; obvious OCR errors were corrected, and passages marked “OCR uncertain” could not be confidently corrected, so check them against the linked scan page.

Objection 1: It would seem that not every act of willin the damned is evil. For according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv.), the demons desire the good and the best, namely to be, to live, to understand. Since, then, men who are damned are not worse off than the demons, it would seem that they also can have a good will.

Obj. 2: Further, As Dionysius says (ibid.), evil is altogether involuntary. 'Therefore if the damned will anything, they will it as something good or apparently good. Nowa will that is directly ordered to good is itself good. Therefore the damned can have a good will.

Obj. 3: Further, Some will be damned who, while in this world, acquired certain habits of virtue, for instance heathens who had civic virtues. Now a will elicits praiseworthy acts by reason of virtuous habits. Therefore there may be praiseworthy acts of the will in some of the damned.

On the contrary, An obstinate will can never be inclined except to evil. Now men who are damned will be obstinate even as the demons.* Therefore their will can never be good.

Further, As the will of the damned is in relation to evil, so is the will of the blessed in regard to good. But the blessed never have an evil will. Neither therefore have the damned any good will.

I answer that, A twofold will may be considered in the damned, namely the deliberate will and the natural will. Their natural will is theirs not of themselves but of the Author of nature, Who gave nature this inclination which we call the natural will. Wherefore since nature remains in them, it follows that the natural will in them can be good. But their deliberate will is theirs of themselves, inasmuch as it is in their power to be inclined by their affections to this or that. This will is in them always evil: and this because they are completely turned away from the last end of a right will, nor can a will be good except it be directed to that same end. Hence even though they will some good, they do not will it well so that one be able to call their will good on that account.

Reply Obj. 1: The words of Dionysius must be understood of the natural will, which is nature's inclination to some particular good. And yet this natural inclination is corrupted by their wickedness, in so far as this good which they desire naturally is desired by them under certain evil circumstances. ft

Reply Obj. 2: Evil, as evil, does not move the will, but in so far as it is thought to be good. Yet it comes of their wickedness that they esteem that which is evil as though it were good. Hence their will is evil.

PAPEL; O.. UXIV:, A) 2

[*Cf. P.L, Q. LXIV., A. 2, ad 5.]

Reply Obj. 3: The habits of civic virtue do not remain in the separated soul, because those virtues perfect us only in the civic life which will not remain after this life. Even though they remained, they would never come into action, being enchained, as it were, by the obstinacy of the mind.

_______________________

Also online, linked only: the same translation at New Advent and the Latin text at Corpus Thomisticum. Neither is copied here.

Source: Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, Supplement to the Third Part. Internet Archive scans: Third Part, Fourth Number (QQ. LXXXIV to Suppl. XXXIII), 1917, Third Part (Supplement), QQ. XXXIV to LXVIII, 1922, Third Part (Supplement), QQ. LXIX to LXXXVI, 1921, and Third Part (Supplement), QQ. LXXXVII to XCIX and Appendices, 1922; two curled pages of the 1921 volume are read from another scan of the same printing. Public domain in the USA. Printed in 1917, 1921, and 1922, before 1931. Outside the U.S., check local copyright rules. Transcription, OCR file checksums, and method: source record.